Need for Cognition Scale (NCS)

1. Abstract

The Need for Cognition Scale (NCS) is an extensively validated psychometric instrument designed to assess an individual’s intrinsic tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors. Originally conceptualized and operationalized by John T. Cacioppo and Richard E. Petty in 1982 as a 34-item inventory, the scale was subsequently refined into an 18-item short form by Cacioppo, Petty, and Chuan Feng Kao in 1984. The instrument measures an enduring motivational orientation toward epistemic engagement rather than intellectual capacity, fluid intelligence, or cognitive competence per se. Responses are typically recorded on a 5-point Likert scale (ranging from 1 = Extremely uncharacteristic of me to 5 = Extremely characteristic of me, or alternatively scored from -2 to +2 / -4 to +4), yielding a cumulative composite score where higher values represent a pronounced propensity for chronic cognitive elaboration. Across more than four decades of psychometric scrutiny, the 18-item short form has demonstrated robust internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha coefficients typically ranging from .85 to .91, strong test-retest temporal stability, and a dominant unidimensional latent structure, despite psychometric debates concerning method-effect variance associated with reverse-keyed items. The scale serves as an empirical pillar in social psychology, persuasion theory, consumer behavior, and cognitive neuroscience, functioning as a primary moderator within the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) of persuasion. Individuals characterized by high Need for Cognition (NFC) systematically evaluate argumentative strength, resist superficial peripheral cues, display lower susceptibility to heuristic biases, and exhibit sustained epistemic curiosity. This comprehensive article provides an exhaustive examination of the scale’s historical evolution, theoretical underpinnings, latent dimensional structure, psychometric validity, reliability metrics, scoring protocols, and research implementations.

2. Keywords

Need for Cognition, Need for Cognition Scale, Elaboration Likelihood Model, cognitive motivation, dual-process theory, epistemic curiosity, central route persuasion, individual differences, psychometrics, scale validation, Cacioppo and Petty, information processing, cognitive effort, argument quality.

3. Authors

The Need for Cognition Scale was originally developed and psychometrically established by:

• John T. Cacioppo, Ph.D. (1951–2018): Formerly the Tiffany and Margaret Blake Distinguished Service Professor of Psychology and Behavioral Neuroscience at the University of Chicago, and Director of the Center for Cognitive and Social Neuroscience. Cacioppo was a foundational pioneer in social neuroscience and attitude change theory.
• Richard E. Petty, Ph.D.: Distinguished University Professor of Psychology at The Ohio State University. Petty is a leading international authority on social cognition, attitudes, and the co-creator of the Elaboration Likelihood Model.
• Chuan Feng Kao, Ph.D.: Collaborator and co-author of the psychometrically optimized 18-item short form (1984), affiliated at the time of development with the Department of Psychology at the University of Iowa.

4. Purpose

The primary purpose of the Need for Cognition Scale is to operationalize and quantify chronic individual differences in the motivation to seek out, engage in, and derive intrinsic satisfaction from effortful analytical thinking, complex problem solving, and cognitive deliberation. While cognitive abilities—such as those assessed through standardized intelligence quotients (IQ), working memory capacity tasks, or standardized academic metrics (e.g., SAT, ACT, GRE)—gauge an individual’s maximal cognitive capacity or processing efficiency, the NCS measures the motivational disposition to deploy those cognitive resources spontaneously in daily life.

Historically, the scale addressed a critical theoretical necessity within cognitive and social psychology. In 1955, Arthur R. Cohen, Ewart Stotland, and Donald M. Wolfe introduced the earliest conceptualization of a “need for cognition,” which they defined as a need to understand and make reasonable the experiential world. However, their initial experimental operationalization relied on complex, ad-hoc projective methodologies and problem-solving frustration tasks that lacked psychometric standardization, internal consistency, and construct independence from generalized cognitive dissonance or ambiguity intolerance. Recognizing this limitation, Cacioppo and Petty (1982) reconstructed the construct as a stable, measurable personality trait capturing the joy of intellectual deliberation, mental challenge, and cognitive persistence.

In empirical research, the NCS fulfills several essential diagnostic and predictive functions:

• Moderation of Persuasive Communication: As the foundational individual-difference variable in the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), the NCS predicts whether individuals will process information primarily via the central route (scrutinizing message arguments, logic, and factual merits) or the peripheral route (relying on surface-level heuristics, source attractiveness, communicator credibility, or emotional framing).
• Consumer and Marketing Behavior: Consumer psychologists utilize the NCS to evaluate consumer susceptibility to advertising tactics, price-quality heuristics, promotion signals without objective savings, and brand narrative framing. Consumers low in NFC are frequently swayed by endorser prestige and aesthetic packaging, whereas consumers high in NFC demand detailed nutritional, technological, or comparative evidentiary data.
• Cognitive Bias and Decision Making: The scale serves to investigate cognitive miserliness versus cognitive elaboration. High-NFC individuals show greater resistance to anchoring effects, framing distortions, halo effects, and the sunk cost fallacy, as they are naturally inclined to decompose complex problems systematically rather than relying on intuitive heuristics.
• Political Psychology and Public Health: The NCS aids in understanding how voters digest political debates, policy proposals, and public health advisories (e.g., vaccine safety campaigns). High-NFC citizens demand nuanced, policy-oriented discourse, whereas low-NFC voters are more responsive to slogan simplicity, affective appeal, and source familiarity.

5. Psychological Construct

The psychological construct of Need for Cognition represents a stable, dimensional personality trait characterized by an intrinsic reward system tied to mental exertion. It is not an imperative drive state analogous to primary physiological drives (e.g., hunger, thirst) nor a neurotic compulsion, but rather an epistemic, motivational preference for intellectual challenge. Understanding the depth of this construct requires delineating its core dimensions and differentiating it from adjacent psychological constructs.

5.1 Core Facets of the Construct

Although psychometrically classified as a unidimensional scale, the operational domain of Need for Cognition spans several interrelated behavioral and phenomenological facets:

• Intrinsic Enjoyment of Effortful Thinking: Individuals high in NFC do not merely tolerate complex cognitive tasks out of necessity; they experience deliberate cognitive processing as inherently pleasurable, intrinsically rewarding, and stimulating (e.g., Item 6: “I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours”).
• Preference for Complexity Over Simplicity: The construct reflects an active attraction toward multifaceted, ambiguous, and conceptually demanding challenges rather than straightforward, repetitive routines (e.g., Item 1: “I would prefer complex to simple problems”).
• Epistemic Exploration and Puzzle Solving: High-NFC individuals possess a dispositional curiosity that manifests in seeking out puzzles, novel cognitive paradigms, and abstract intellectual frameworks (e.g., Item 13: “I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve”; Item 14: “The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me”).
• Rejection of Cognitive Miserliness: Low-NFC individuals, conversely, operate strictly in alignment with the “cognitive miser” model (Fiske & Taylor, 1984), allocating mental effort only when externally demanded or incentivized (e.g., Item 7: “I only think as hard as I have to”; Item 9: “I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them”).

5.2 Conceptual Distinctions from Related Constructs

To establish construct validity, psychometricians have meticulously delineated the Need for Cognition from adjacent personality, cognitive, and affective dimensions:

• NFC vs. General Intelligence ($g$): Although moderately correlated with verbal intelligence ($r \approx .20 – .35$), NFC is distinct from fluid and crystallized intelligence. Intelligence reflects cognitive capacity (what a person can do under maximal performance conditions), whereas NFC reflects cognitive motivation (what a person wants to do under typical performance conditions). An individual with high fluid intelligence may nonetheless be low in NFC, preferring effortless heuristic shortcuts when not explicitly evaluated.
• NFC vs. Need for Cognitive Closure (NFCC): Conceptualized by Arie Kruglanski, the Need for Closure involves a desire for an immediate, definitive answer to avoid confusion or ambiguity, often resulting in premature cognitive “freezing” and “seizing.” In contrast, high-NFC individuals tolerate ambiguity comfortably and enjoy the iterative, deliberative process of exploration, exhibiting a low need for premature closure.
• NFC vs. Need for Affect (NFA): Formulated by Gregory Maio and Victoria Esses, the Need for Affect measures the motivation to approach or avoid emotion-inducing situations. Empirical studies demonstrate that NFC and NFA are orthogonal dimensions: an individual can possess high NFC and high NFA simultaneously, processing both affective narratives and rational arguments deeply.
• NFC vs. Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI): Seymour Epstein’s Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) posits two processing modes: Rational and Experiential. Epstein’s Rational Processing Style scale incorporates adapted NCS items. However, while the Rational style emphasizes the conscious, logical, analytic processing of data, the NCS specifically emphasizes the intrinsic pleasure and effortful motivation derived from intellectual tasks.
• NFC vs. Five-Factor Model (Big Five): Meta-analyses demonstrate that NFC correlates moderately to strongly with Openness to Experience / Intellect ($r \approx .45 – .55$), particularly with the Intellect and Ideas subfacets. However, it displays negligible or near-zero correlations with Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Agreeableness, and only modest correlations with Conscientiousness ($r \approx .15 – .25$).

6. Theoretical Framework

The Need for Cognition Scale is deeply embedded within 20th and 21st-century dual-process theories of cognition, most notably the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) formulated by Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo (1981, 1986). The theoretical framework posits that attitude change and cognitive processing occur along an elaboration likelihood continuum anchored by two distinct psychological routes:

6.1 The Elaboration Likelihood Continuum

The central postulate of the ELM is that the probability of message-relevant elaboration depends on two interactive parameters: an individual’s motivation to process the message and their ability to process it. While situational factors (e.g., distraction, personal involvement, message repetition) influence motivation and ability dynamically, the Need for Cognition represents the primary stable individual-difference determinant of intrinsic processing motivation.

When an individual high in NFC encounters a persuasive argument, their chronic predisposition elevates them along the elaboration continuum toward the Central Route:

• Central Route Processing: High elaboration involves active cognitive processing, rigorous assessment of premise validity, generation of cognitive responses (pro-arguments or counter-arguments), integration of message arguments into existing epistemic schemata, and critical discernment between sound empirical claims and specious rhetoric. Attitudes formed via the central route are characterized by temporal persistence, resistance to counter-propaganda, and high predictive power regarding future overt behavior.
• Peripheral Route Processing: Conversely, individuals low in NFC generally default to the peripheral route in the absence of acute situational relevance. Their cognitive processing is guided by heuristic cues: communicator physical attractiveness, source expertise or perceived status, the sheer count of arguments regardless of logical validity, or accompanying pleasant environmental stimuli (e.g., background music, free gifts). Attitudes formed peripherally are typically ephemeral, vulnerable to counter-persuasion, and loosely coupled with subsequent behavior.

6.2 Cognitive Miserliness and Evolutionary Theories of Effort

The secondary theoretical framework anchoring the scale is Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor’s Cognitive Miser Theory (1984), supplemented by modern evolutionary cognitive psychology (e.g., Stanovich & West, 2000; Kahneman, 2011). Because biological brains are metabolic energy sinks consuming disproportionate caloric resources, humanity evolved an adaptive bias toward heuristic, computationally cheap cognition (System 1 processing). High-effort, rule-based, deliberative cognition (System 2 processing) requires extensive computational and physiological resources.

From an evolutionary and individual-differences standpoint, the Need for Cognition represents the psychological threshold at which System 2 engagement transitions from being experienced as a subjective burden to an intrinsically rewarding activity. Where the modal cognitive miser seeks to terminate mental effort at the earliest acceptable heuristic threshold (satisficing), the high-NFC individual experiences epistemic dissatisfaction until deep structural comprehension is attained.

7. Validity

The psychometric integrity of the Need for Cognition Scale (specifically the 18-item short form) has been documented across thousands of empirical studies spanning laboratory experiments, longitudinal field trials, and meta-analytic syntheses.

7.1 Construct and Convergent Validity

Construct validity has been demonstrated through strong, theoretically coherent correlations with relevant psychological metrics:

• Cognitive Aptitude and Epistemic Metrics: Positive, moderate correlations are systematically observed with verbal ability ($r = .20 – .35$), formal reasoning tasks ($r = .30 – .42$), critical thinking appraisals (such as the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal; $r = .35 – .45$), and Openness to Ideas ($r = .48 – .56$).
• Epistemic Curiosity: Correlations between the NCS and Kashdan’s Curiosity and Exploration Inventory (CEI-II) as well as Litman’s Epistemic Curiosity scales consistently exceed $r = .50$, particularly regarding the “deprivation” and “interest” subscales of epistemic drive.
• Educational Achievement: In collegiate and secondary school populations, NCS significantly predicts cumulative grade point average (GPA), self-directed academic studying behaviors, and persistence on difficult problem-solving matrices, independent of standardized baseline SAT/ACT scores.

7.2 Discriminant Validity

To confirm that the NCS does not merely reflect generalized positive self-concept, social desirability, or affective adjustment, discriminant validity has been repeatedly substantiated:

• Social Desirability: Correlations with the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale are uniformly trivial to weak ($r = -.05$ to $.12$), confirming that high-NFC endorsements are not driven by social approval-seeking.
• Affective and Emotional Dimensions: The NCS exhibits near-zero correlations with trait anxiety ($r = -.08$), test anxiety ($r = -.06$), self-esteem ($r = .12$), and depression scales, verifying that the measure is not an artifact of psychological distress or emotional resilience.
• Dogmatism and Authoritarianism: Studies show mild to moderate negative correlations with Rokeach’s Dogmatism Scale ($r = -.25$ to $-.38$) and Right-Wing Authoritarianism ($r = -.20$ to $-.32$), demonstrating that intellectual curiosity conflicts with rigid ideological inflexibility.

7.3 Predictive and Criterion Validity

The predictive power of the NCS has been validated through rigorous experimental paradigms:

• Argument Quality Sensitivity: In classic experiments replicating Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman (1981), participants classified as high in NFC significantly discriminate between strong arguments (e.g., logically coherent, evidence-backed policy proposals) and weak arguments (e.g., anecdotal, fallacious claims). In contrast, low-NFC participants show minimal differential attitude shift based on argument quality, responding primarily to peripheral cues such as communicator status or visual formatting.
• Mitigation of Heuristic Biases: High-NFC individuals demonstrate lower susceptibility to the halo effect in performance evaluations, show reduced framing biases in behavioral economics tasks (Tversky & Kahneman choice dilemmas), and exhibit higher resistance to post-event misinformation in eyewitness identification paradigms.
• Information Search Breadth: In complex decision-making environments (e.g., mock medical diagnosis, investment simulations, voter platforms), high-NFC individuals search for more extensive diagnostic information, inspect contrary evidence longer, and generate more comprehensive cognitive maps prior to decision commitment.

8. Reliability

The 18-item Need for Cognition Scale exhibits exceptional reliability across diverse demographics, languages, and measurement modalities.

8.1 Internal Consistency

The original 34-item formulation (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) demonstrated an internal consistency coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) of $\alpha = .87$ to $.91$. When Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao (1984) constructed the 18-item short form, they utilized item-to-total correlations and factor loadings to identify the most psychometrically informative items, producing an abbreviated scale that maintained equal or superior internal consistency ($lpha = .90$).

Subsequent psychometric investigations have consistently replicated these values:

• University Populations: Typical alpha values range between $\alpha = .88$ and $.91$.
• General Adult Populations: Representative community surveys typically report alphas between $\alpha = .85$ and $.89$.
• Cross-Cultural Translations: Validated adaptations worldwide report robust reliability indices: German version ($lpha = .86 – .89$), French version ($lpha = .84 – .88$), Spanish adaptation ($lpha = .85 – .87$), Chinese adaptation ($lpha = .86 – .90$), and Turkish version ($lpha = .82 – .87$).
• McDonald’s Omega: Contemporary structural equation evaluations utilizing model-based internal consistency estimators confirm robust values for Omega total ($\omega_t ge .90$) and Omega hierarchical ($\omega_h ge .83$), demonstrating that the composite score is dominated by a general latent factor.

8.2 Test-Retest Temporal Stability

Because Need for Cognition is conceptualized as an enduring personality trait rather than a transient state, temporal stability across longitudinal intervals is essential. Empirical test-retest investigations confirm high stability coefficients:

• Short-Term Stability (7 to 14 weeks): Pearson correlation coefficients range from $r = .88$ to $.91$ among university samples, indicating minimal measurement noise across academic semesters (Sadowski & Gulgoz, 1992).
• Medium-Term Stability (1 to 2 years): Longitudinal panels tracking emerging adults and professional cohorts yield stability indices between $r = .74$ and $.82$, comparable to the Big Five personality traits.
• Long-Term Stability (Multi-Year): Cross-lagged panel modeling demonstrates that while cognitive life events (e.g., advanced graduate training, cognitive rehabilitation) can modestly shape NFC, the rank-order stability remains highly preserved across the lifespan.

9. Factor Analysis

The latent dimensionality of the 18-item Need for Cognition Scale has been the subject of extensive psychometric exploration, centering primarily on the debate between a pure unidimensional construct versus a two-factor method-artifact model driven by item polarity.

9.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)

In the foundational validation of the short form, Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao (1984) performed Principal Components Analysis (PCA) and common factor analysis on the 18 items. The analysis revealed a dominant first factor accounting for the vast majority of the common variance (eigenvalue typically $> 6.5$), with an eigenvalue ratio of the first to the second factor exceeding 3.5:1. All 18 items displayed substantial factor loadings on this primary dimension (all standardized loadings $lambda > .40$, with the majority exceeding $.55$). Based on standard psychometric criteria (e.g., Cattell’s scree test, Kaiser-Guttman criterion), the authors concluded that the scale is essentially unidimensional.

9.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and Method Effects

Subsequent modern structural equation modeling (SEM) evaluations (e.g., Bors, Vigneau, & Lalande, 2006; Forsterlee & Ho, 1999) frequently observed that a strict one-factor model yields borderline acceptable fit indices when error covariances among reverse-scored items are constrained to zero (e.g., $\chi^2 / df > 3.0$, $\text{RMSEA} \approx .07 – .09$, $\text{CFI} \approx .88 – .91$). When an unconstrained exploratory or two-factor CFA is conducted, items cleanly separate into two distinct latent factors:

1. Factor 1: Cognitive Engagement / Enjoyment (consisting of the 9 positively phrased items: 1, 2, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18).
2. Factor 2: Cognitive Avoidance / Low Effort (consisting of the 9 reverse-scored items: 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 16, 17).

This empirical divergence prompted extensive inquiry into whether Need for Cognition comprises two substantive psychological subscales or whether this bifurcation is a classic method artifact stemming from response style variance, acquiescence tendencies, or cognitive processing of negation in reverse-coded statements.

9.3 Bifactor Modeling and Resolution

The consensus among psychometricians (e.g., Bors et al., 2011) has been achieved via Bifactor Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Multitrait-Multimethod (MTMM) structural models. When a general Need for Cognition factor ($G$) is modeled alongside two orthogonal method factors ($M_1$ for positive framing, $M_2$ for negative framing):

• The general factor ($G$) accounts for over $80-85%$ of the common variance.
• Standardized loadings on the general factor remain robust across both item types (typical $lambda = .50 – .75$).
• Explained Common Variance (ECV) and the Percentage of Uncontaminated Correlations (PUC) meet the criteria establishing that the scale can be treated as essentially unidimensional for research, scoring, and practical diagnostic purposes.
• Model fit indices for the bifactor configuration or one-factor model with correlated uniquenesses for reverse items are uniformly outstanding: $\text{CFI} ge .96$, $\text{TLI} ge .95$, $\text{RMSEA} le .045$, and $\text{SRMR} le .038$.

Researchers are therefore advised to sum or average the items into a single global Need for Cognition score after appropriately inverting the 9 reverse-scored items.

10. Instrument / Measurement Tool

• Test Name: Need for Cognition Scale (NCS) – 18-Item Short Form (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984).
• Instrument Type: Self-report psychological questionnaire / Individual differences inventory.
• Target Population: Adolescents and adults (typically administered from grade 9 to adulthood). Suitable for non-clinical, collegiate, corporate, and generalized research settings.
• Item Count: 18 items (condensed from the original 34-item instrument).
• Administration Time: Approximately 3 to 5 minutes.
• Administration Modality: Paper-and-pencil, computer-administered survey platforms (e.g., Qualtrics, REDCap), or mobile assessment interfaces.
• Authentic Response Scale: 5-point Likert scale (+4 to -4 or 1 to 5; typically 1 = Extremely uncharacteristic of me, 2 = Somewhat uncharacteristic of me, 3 = Uncertain, 4 = Somewhat characteristic of me, 5 = Extremely characteristic of me, or -2 = very strong disagreement to +2 = very strong agreement).
• Direction of Scoring:
  • Directly Scored Items (9 items): Items 1, 2, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, and 18 are scored in the forward direction ($1 to 1, 2 to 2, 3 to 3, 4 to 4, 5 to 5$).
  • Reverse Scored Items (9 items): Items 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 16, and 17 must be reverse-scored prior to composite calculation. For a 1 to 5 scale, recode as: $1 to 5, 2 to 4, 3 to 3, 4 to 2, 5 to 1$ (or calculated algebraically as $\text{Recoded Score} = 6 – \text{Raw Score}$).
• Scoring Protocol & Interpretation:
  • Summed Score: Summing all 18 recoded items produces a continuous total score ranging from 18 to 90 (or -36 to +36 when scored using a -2 to +2 format). Higher scores represent a higher Need for Cognition.
  • Mean Score: Calculating the arithmetic mean of all 18 recoded items produces a continuous index ranging from 1.00 to 5.00.
  • Analytical Categorization: While continuous score modeling (via regression or SEM) is strongly recommended over artificial dichotomization to prevent statistical power loss, researchers implementing split-group experimental designs typically utilize median splits or upper/lower tertile cutoffs.

11. Permissions & Fee and Test Year

• Year of Publication: 1982 (original 34-item scale; Cacioppo & Petty); 1984 (standard 18-item short form; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao).
• Copyright & Accessibility: The 18-item Need for Cognition Scale is published in the public domain for academic, scientific, and non-commercial educational research purposes. It was published in standard academic journals under the auspices of the American Psychological Association (APA) and the Psychonomic Society.
• Fee: There are no licensing fees, royalties, or commercial costs associated with utilizing the standard 18-item scale for academic, clinical, or institutional non-commercial research.
• Permissions & Attribution: Formal written permission from the copyright holders is not required for academic research use, provided that full scholarly citation and attribution are given to the seminal publications (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). Commercial enterprises incorporating the scale into proprietary commercial assessments should consult standard APA fair-use guidelines and publisher licensing policies.

12. References

Below is a curated selection of foundational and contemporary academic references documenting the development, validation, and applications of the Need for Cognition Scale:

• Bors, D. A., Vigneau, F., & Lalande, F. (2006). Measuring the need for cognition: Item-level psychometrics, dimensionality, and the relation with ability. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science / Revue canadienne des sciences du comportement, 38(3), 202–212. https://doi.org/10.1037/cjbs2006008
• Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42(1), 116–131. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.42.1.116
• Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Kao, C. F. (1984). The efficient assessment of need for cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48(3), 306–307. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13
• Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., Feinstein, J. A., & Jarvis, W. B. G. (1996). Dispositional differences in cognitive motivation: The life and times of individuals varying in need for cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 119(2), 197–253. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.119.2.197
• Cohen, A. R., Stotland, E., & Wolfe, D. M. (1955). An experimental investigation of need for cognition. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51(2), 291–294. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0042761
• Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V., & Heier, H. (1996). Individual differences in intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking styles. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(2), 390–405. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.71.2.390
• Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1984). Social Cognition. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
• Forsterlee, R., & Ho, R. (1999). An examination of the academic performance of Australian undergraduate students as a function of the need for cognition. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 69(4), 555–566. https://doi.org/10.1348/000709999157888
• Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
• Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: “Seizing” and “freezing.” Psychological Review, 103(2), 263–283. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.103.2.263
• Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 19, 123–205. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60214-2
• Petty, R. E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Goldman, R. (1981). Personal involvement as a determinant of argument-based persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41(5), 847–855. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.41.5.847
• Sadowski, C. J., & Gulgoz, S. (1992). Internal consistency and test-retest reliability of the Need for Cognition Scale. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 74(2), 610–610. https://doi.org/10.2466/pms.1992.74.2.610
• Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23(5), 645–665. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00003435
• Wood, S. L., & Swait, J. (2002). Psychological indicators of innovation adoption: Cross-classification of need for cognition and need for change. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 12(1), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327663JCP1201_01

13. Items of the Scale