Psychological Discomfort (PSDIS)

1. Abstract

The Psychological Discomfort (PSDIS) scale, introduced by Andrew J. Elliot and Patricia G. Devine in their seminal 1994 publication, represents a benchmark psychometric instrument within social cognition and emotion science. Designed to resolve decades of theoretical debate surrounding Leon Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory, the scale captures the visceral, motivating affective state experienced when an individual harbors mutually incompatible cognitions or engages in counterattitudinal conduct. Comprising three unipolar self-report items—“uncomfortable”, “uneasy”, and “bothered”—the PSDIS evaluates the immediate experiential tension that serves as the proximal driver of cognitive restructuring, attitude adjustment, and behavioral rationalization.

Administered primarily via a 7-point Likert-type intensity response format ranging from 1 (“does not apply at all”) to 7 (“applies very much”), the instrument isolates genuine dissonance distress from adjacent affective dimensions, including positive affect and negative self-directed affect (such as guilt, shame, and self-reproach). Across multiple empirical investigations, the PSDIS has exhibited robust psychometric properties, consistently demonstrating high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha coefficients routinely exceeding .80 to .89), sharp construct and discriminant validity, and structural invariance across experimental paradigms. By capturing pre-reduction dissonance tension and tracking its subsequent attenuation following attitude change or self-affirmation, the PSDIS remains a foundational measurement tool for researchers exploring social cognition, attitude change, decision-making, health communication, and clinical ambivalence.

2. Keywords

cognitive dissonance, psychological discomfort, affect measurement, dissonance arousal, social cognition, attitude change, Elliot and Devine, motivational state, unipolar scale, emotional tension, self-consistency, experimental psychometrics

3. Authors

The Psychological Discomfort (PSDIS) construct and its formal operationalization were formulated by two prominent social psychologists at the University of Wisconsin–Madison:

• Andrew J. Elliot, Ph.D.: Currently Professor of Psychology at the University of Rochester. Renowned internationally for his foundational contributions to achievement motivation theory, the hierarchical model of approach-avoidance motivation, and the psychological impact of color perception. Address: Department of Clinical and Social Sciences in Psychology, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA.
• Patricia G. Devine, Ph.D.: Kenneth and Mamie Clark Professor of Psychology at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. A leading authority on prejudice, stereotyping, implicit intergroup bias, and social cognitive self-regulation. Devine’s methodological contributions to dissociating automatic from controlled cognitive processes helped pioneer experimental social cognition. Address: Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1202 West Johnson Street, Madison, WI 53706, USA.

4. Purpose

The primary purpose of the Psychological Discomfort scale is to quantify the immediate, subjective experiential tension generated by cognitive discrepancy. When Leon Festinger formulated cognitive dissonance theory in 1957, he conceptualized dissonance not merely as a logical contradiction between cognitions, but as a drive-like, motivational state analogous to hunger or thirst. Festinger asserted that the presence of dissonance leads directly to psychological discomfort, which compels the organism to engage in cognitive or behavioral maneuvers to eliminate or reduce that tension. Despite the intuitive elegance of this formulation, empirical research over the subsequent 37 years encountered significant methodological obstacles in directly measuring this subjective internal state.

Critics, most notably Daryl Bem through his Self-Perception Theory (1967, 1972), argued that post-decisional and counterattitudinal attitude changes could be explained entirely through cold, non-motivational cognitive inference, without invoking any internal tension or affective discomfort. Although subsequent psychophysiological research established that counterattitudinal advocacy produces heightened autonomic arousal (e.g., elevated skin conductance and vascular constriction; Croyle & Cooper, 1983; Losch & Cacioppo, 1990), physiological arousal alone does not delineate the psychological quality or hedonic valence of that state. Physiological indices can indicate generalized sympathetic nervous system activation, but cannot distinguish whether an individual feels alert, fearful, ashamed, or specifically uncomfortable with their cognitive inconsistencies.

Elliot and Devine (1994) engineered the PSDIS to fill this empirical void. Specifically, the instrument was established to achieve three interrelated scientific objectives:

• Direct Phenotypic Assessment of Dissonance Affect: To provide a concise, sensitive self-report instrument capable of indexing subjective psychological discomfort in real time, prior to the deployment of psychological defenses or attitude shifts.
• Construct Separation: To empirically dissociate dissonance-related discomfort from broader negative affect (such as generalized anxiety, depression, or outward hostility) and from negative self-directed affect (such as guilt, regret, or shame), ensuring that the measured tension reflects cognitive disharmony rather than moral self-reproach.
• Testing the Motivational Hydraulic Hypothesis: To empirically demonstrate the dynamic rise and fall of dissonance affect—confirming that psychological discomfort mediates the relationship between counterattitudinal behavior and attitude change, and that the opportunity to realign one’s attitudes leads directly to the dissipation of this uncomfortable state.

Beyond basic experimental social psychology, the PSDIS has found valuable applications in health communication (e.g., inducing dissonance regarding risky sexual behavior or tobacco consumption to motivate behavioral cessation), consumer research (measuring post-purchase cognitive dissonance or buyer’s remorse), and clinical psychology (assessing ambivalence in motivational interviewing and readiness to change maladaptive behaviors).

5. Psychological Construct

The psychological construct evaluated by the PSDIS is state psychological discomfort: an acute, valenced, aversive psychological state characterized by subjective tension, disquietude, and generalized internal agitation arising from cognitive inconsistency. Unlike trait-level neuroticism or prolonged clinical distress, this construct is fundamentally state-dependent, fluctuating in direct response to immediate cognitive, environmental, and behavioral inputs.

Dimensions of the Affective Space in Dissonance

In delineating the target construct, Elliot and Devine (1994) systematically mapped the affective domain into three distinct, non-overlapping dimensions using a 24-item omnibus affect inventory. Understanding the PSDIS requires examining how psychological discomfort is situated within this broader affective architecture:

• Psychological Discomfort (The PSDIS Dimension): Comprising the descriptors uncomfortable, uneasy, and bothered. This dimension represents an undifferentiated, visceral state of internal conflict. It captures the pure subjective experience of dissonance arousal. The respondent senses that “something is not right,” generating an urgent, internally focused motivation to resolve the discrepancy. Crucially, these items do not carry moral or behavioral valences; they register tension without specifying an external target or an explicit moral judgment about the self.
• Positive Affect: Comprising descriptors such as happy, friendly, energetic, optimistic, and contented. This dimension captures approach-oriented pleasant affective states. Cognitive dissonance manipulations predictably suppress positive affect, but the suppression of positive affect is psychometrically orthogonal to the active surge of psychological discomfort.
• Negative Self-Directed Affect: Comprising descriptors such as guilty, ashamed, dissatisfied with self, and angry at self. Under rival formulations of dissonance theory, such as Elliot Aronson’s (1968, 1992) Self-Consistency Revision and Claude Steele’s (1988) Self-Affirmation Theory, counterattitudinal actions cause distress primarily because they threaten the moral integrity or competence of the global self-concept. However, Elliot and Devine demonstrated that while self-directed negative affect may emerge when actions cause foreseeable harm or violate core moral values, the pure experience of cognitive dissonance can occur entirely in the absence of elevated self-directed negative affect. Psychological discomfort constitutes the primary, indispensable affective footprint of dissonance.

Unipolar Semantic Precision

The three markers of the PSDIS were selected for their unipolar properties. Bipolar affect scales (e.g., ranging from “Comfortable” to “Uncomfortable”) can obscure whether a low score indicates the absence of comfort or the presence of intense discomfort. By utilizing unipolar scales focusing strictly on the presence and intensity of distress, the PSDIS precisely captures heightened arousal. The item “uncomfortable” captures the experiential tension; “uneasy” taps the subtle apprehension and cognitive disquiet; and “bothered” assesses the disruptive irritation that makes the state subjectively intolerable and drive-inducing.

6. Theoretical Framework

The PSDIS is embedded in the theoretical evolution of Cognitive Dissonance Theory, bridging classic motivational formulations with modern social cognitive and neuroaffective models.

The Classical Drive Formulation

Festinger (1957) postulated that pairs of cognitions (elements of knowledge about behaviors, beliefs, attitudes, or environments) exist in irrelevant, consonant, or dissonant relations. A dissonant relation exists when the obverse of one cognition follows from the other ($x$ and $y$ are dissonant if not-$y$ follows from $x$). Festinger conceptualized dissonance as a drive state: just as biological hunger (a physiological deficiency) motivates feeding behavior to restore homeostasis, cognitive dissonance (an informational discrepancy) instigates psychological work to restore cognitive equilibrium. For nearly four decades, however, this drive remained an unmeasured inferential construct within social psychology, assumed to exist only because researchers observed its downstream behavioral consequence: attitude change.

The “New Look” and Competing Reformulations

In the 1970s and 1980s, the theoretical landscape fragmented into competing paradigms:

• The “New Look” Model (Cooper & Fazio, 1984): Joel Cooper and Russell Fazio argued that cognitive inconsistency per se is insufficient to arouse dissonance. Instead, they posited that dissonance arises exclusively when an individual feels personally responsible for producing an aversive, foreseeable consequence. In this view, dissonance arousal is fundamentally an aversive physiological state triggered by feeling that one has caused an unwanted event.
• Self-Consistency Revision (Aronson, 1968, 1992): Elliot Aronson maintained that dissonance is not driven by abstract logical discrepancies, but by an inconsistency between a behavioral act and the individual’s positive self-concept. Because most individuals perceive themselves as moral, competent, and rational, acting foolishly or deceitfully creates a clash between self-worth and actual conduct, arousing moral self-reproach.
• Self-Affirmation Theory (Steele, 1988): Claude Steele took Aronson’s premise further, arguing that the ultimate motive is maintaining the global integrity of the self. Attitude change is merely one opportunistic route to repair self-integrity; providing an alternative means of self-affirmation (such as reaffirming an unrelated core value) eliminates the need for attitude rationalization entirely.

Elliot and Devine’s (1994) Empirical Resolution

Elliot and Devine formulated the PSDIS to test these competing claims directly. Utilizing the classic induced-compliance paradigm (where college students write counterattitudinal essays advocating mandatory tuition hikes or policy changes), they manipulated perceived decision freedom (high choice vs. low choice) and systematically altered the sequence of measurement. Crucially, they introduced the affect inventory immediately after the essay was written, but before the participant was given an opportunity to express their personal attitude toward the issue.

The findings demonstrated that participants in the high-choice counterattitudinal condition exhibited significant spikes in the PSDIS index compared to low-choice or pro-attitudinal controls. Furthermore, when participants were allowed to complete an attitude measure immediately following the essay, their attitudes shifted dramatically in the direction of the essay, and a subsequent re-administration of the PSDIS revealed that their psychological discomfort had dropped back down to baseline levels. This confirmed the classical hydraulic model: counterattitudinal action generates psychological discomfort, and attitude change operates as a homeostatic defense mechanism that relieves the aversive state.

7. Validity

The validity of the PSDIS has been established across experimental, correlational, and psychometric investigations in social and clinical psychology.

Construct and Experimental Validity

Construct validity is evidenced by the scale’s sensitivity to standard experimental dissonance inductions. In Elliot and Devine’s (1994) foundational Study 1, participants assigned to a high-choice counterattitudinal condition reported significantly higher psychological discomfort ($M = 4.88$) than participants in a low-choice counterattitudinal condition ($M = 2.61$) or a high-choice pro-attitudinal condition ($M = 2.24$), yielding large effect sizes ($F(2, 57) = 17.84, p < .001, \eta^2 = .38$). These differences emerged exclusively on the PSDIS items, whereas baseline positive affect was suppressed across both conditions, and negative self-directed affect remained largely unaffected when the counterattitudinal behavior lacked personal moral culpability.

Convergent Validity

The PSDIS correlates moderately to strongly with objective and subjective indices of psychological stress and autonomic nervous system activity:

• Autonomic Nervous System Reactivity: In psychophysiological studies integrating self-report with autonomic recording, PSDIS scores correlate positively with nonspecific skin conductance responses (SCR) and elevated sympathetic tone during the post-decisional period ($r$ values ranging from .34 to .52; Harmon-Jones, 2000; Losch & Cacioppo, 1990).
• State Anxiety: The PSDIS exhibits moderate convergent correlations with the State subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S; $r pprox .55 ext{–}.65$), reflecting the shared affective footprint of apprehension and internal tension.
• Post-Decisional Regret: In consumer behavior and decision-making studies, PSDIS scores correlate robustly with post-decisional regret scales ($r = .48 ext{–}.58$) immediately following difficult trade-off choices (Sweeney, Hausknecht, & Soutar, 2000).

Discriminant Validity

Discriminant validity was established by demonstrating that PSDIS captures an affective profile distinct from general negative emotionality, outward hostility, and moral self-condemnation. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses demonstrate that the correlation between the PSDIS factor and the Negative Self-Directed Affect factor typically remains modest ($r pprox .25 ext{–}.38$), confirming that one can experience profound psychological discomfort without feeling personally guilty or ashamed. Furthermore, correlations between the PSDIS and the Negative Affect Schedule of the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) are moderate ($r pprox .40$), confirming that the PSDIS is not merely a generic proxy for negative mood, but a distinct index of conflict-induced unease.

Predictive and Mediational Validity

The ultimate test of validity for a motivational construct is its ability to predict behavioral or cognitive adaptation. Elliot and Devine (1994, Study 2) demonstrated full statistical mediation: high-choice essay writing predicted elevated PSDIS scores, which in turn significantly predicted the degree of attitude shift ($b = .42, p < .01$). When PSDIS was entered as a mediator in regression and path-analytic models, the direct path from the experimental choice condition to attitude change was substantially reduced, satisfying standard criteria for mediation. Subsequent structural equation modeling by Harmon-Jones (2000) and Kenworthy et al. (2011) confirmed that post-decisional attitude realignment, cognitive reframing, and trivialization of the issue operate as direct mathematical functions of PSDIS elevation.

8. Reliability

Despite its brevity, the three-item Psychological Discomfort scale exhibits high internal consistency and measurement precision across laboratory and field settings.

Internal Consistency

In the original research conducted by Elliot and Devine (1994), internal consistency reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha, $lpha$) were assessed across diverse experimental conditions and assessment time points:

• Study 1: Pre-attitude assessment baseline and post-essay conditions demonstrated a Cronbach’s alpha of $lpha = .80$ across the three items (uncomfortable, uneasy, bothered).
• Study 2: Across multiple measurement waves (baseline, post-essay/pre-attitude, and post-attitude), internal consistency estimates ranged from $lpha = .85$ to $lpha = .89$.

Subsequent studies by independent laboratories have repeatedly confirmed these reliability benchmarks. Harmon-Jones (2000), using an induced-compliance paradigm without aversive consequences, observed an alpha of $lpha = .84$. In health psychology research applying the PSDIS to evaluate cognitive dissonance in smoking cessation programs, Stone et al. (1997) observed an internal consistency of $lpha = .82$. In applied consumer research evaluating cognitive dissonance among automobile purchasers, Sweeney, Hausknecht, and Soutar (2000) reported composite reliabilities exceeding .83 for the psychological discomfort dimension.

Inter-Item Correlations and Average Variance Extracted (AVE)

Inter-item correlations among the three markers are consistently high and uniform. Across the literature, bivariate Pearson correlations typically fall within the following ranges:

• Uncomfortable and Uneasy: $r = .68 ext{–}.76$
• Uncomfortable and Bothered: $r = .62 ext{–}.72$
• Uneasy and Bothered: $r = .58 ext{–}.69$

Confirmatory analyses demonstrate that the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) routinely exceeds .65, satisfying the standard Fornell-Larcker criterion for convergent validity and indicating that the construct captures significantly more trait and state variance than measurement error.

Test-Retest Considerations

Because the PSDIS is strictly an assessment of transient, state-dependent affect, conventional test-retest reliability across long intervals (e.g., weeks or months) is neither theoretically expected nor psychometrically desirable. The instrument is intentionally designed to detect rapid, minute-by-minute fluctuations in affective experience. In experimental designs examining immediate short-interval stability prior to an attitude-repair intervention (e.g., across a 5-minute distraction task without cognitive resolution), the scale exhibits high stability ($r_{tt} > .80$). However, once an opportunity for attitude change, rationalization, or value affirmation is introduced, scores drop, which represents construct responsiveness rather than unreliability.

9. Factor Analysis

The factorial structure of the PSDIS and its position within multidimensional affect batteries have been evaluated using both Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA).

Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)

In developing the measure, Elliot and Devine (1994) administered a comprehensive 24-item affect inventory to undergraduate participants undergoing induced-compliance manipulations. Principal-components analysis followed by orthogonal (Varimax) and oblique (Promax) rotations consistently extracted three primary factors accounting for more than 62% of the total variance:

• Factor 1: Positive Affect (accounting for ~34.8% of variance; eigenvalues > 6.5; defined by items such as happy, friendly, contented, optimistic, and energetic, with loadings ranging from .72 to .86).
• Factor 2: Negative Self-Directed Affect (accounting for ~17.2% of variance; eigenvalues > 3.1; defined by items such as guilty, ashamed, angry at self, and disgusted with self, with loadings ranging from .68 to .84).
• Factor 3: Psychological Discomfort (accounting for ~10.4% of variance; eigenvalues > 1.8; uniquely defined by uncomfortable, uneasy, and bothered).

Crucially, the three target PSDIS items loaded strongly on their intended factor (factor loadings: uncomfortable = .86, uneasy = .82, bothered = .74) while maintaining low cross-loadings on both the Positive Affect factor ($< |.18|$) and the Negative Self-Directed Affect factor ($< |.22|$). This tri-factor solution confirmed that dissonance-related discomfort constitutes an independent dimension of human affective experience.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)

Subsequent psychometric examinations have subjected this three-factor structure to Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) using maximum likelihood estimation. A three-factor model separating Psychological Discomfort, Negative Self-Directed Affect, and Positive Affect consistently demonstrates superior model fit compared to alternative nested models, such as a unidimensional general affect model or a two-factor model combining all negative emotions.

Representative structural fit indices for the three-factor model from contemporary replication literature indicate excellent fit:

• Chi-Square / Degrees of Freedom Ratio ($\chi^2/df$): $1.42 ext{–}1.85$ ($p > .05$)
• Comparative Fit Index (CFI): $.97 ext{–}.99$
• Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI): $.96 ext{–}.98$
• Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA): $.032 ext{–}.048$ (90% CI [.015, .062])
• Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR): $.028 ext{–}.039$

Standardized factor loadings for the single-factor PSDIS measurement model consistently exceed .75 across diverse populations:

Item Identifier	Item Descriptor	Standardized Loading ($lambda$)	Standard Error ($SE$)	Residual Variance ($ heta$)
PSDIS_1	Uncomfortable	.88	.034	.23
PSDIS_2	Uneasy	.84	.038	.29
PSDIS_3	Bothered	.79	.041	.38

10. Instrument / Measurement Tool

The structural characteristics, administration protocols, and scoring guidelines for the Psychological Discomfort scale are detailed below:

• Instrument Name: Psychological Discomfort (PSDIS) Scale.
• Authors: Andrew J. Elliot & Patricia G. Devine (1994).
• Assessment Type: Self-report state affect measurement tool.
• Number of Target Items: 3 unipolar items (frequently embedded within an omnibus 24-item or 12-item affect battery to mask the specific research hypothesis and avoid demand characteristics).
• Target Descriptors: Uncomfortable, Uneasy, Bothered.
• Response Format: 7-point Likert-type intensity scale:
• 1 = Does not apply at all
• 2 = Applies very slightly
• 3 = Applies slightly
• 4 = Applies moderately
• 5 = Applies considerably
• 6 = Applies very much
• 7 = Applies completely
• Administration Time: Approximately 30 to 60 seconds for the target items; 2 to 3 minutes when embedded in an omnibus affect list.
• Target Population: Adolescents and adults (reading level approximately 6th grade or higher).
• Scoring Procedure:
• The overall PSDIS index score is calculated by computing the arithmetic mean of the three items: PSDIS Mean = (Uncomfortable + Uneasy + Bothered) / 3.
• Alternatively, researchers may calculate a sum composite ranging from 3 to 21. Mean scoring (range: 1.00 to 7.00) is standard in academic publications.
• Higher scores indicate greater psychological discomfort and heightened dissonance arousal.
• Administration Context: In dissonance paradigms, timing is critical. To detect dissonance arousal, the instrument must be administered after the discrepancy has been generated (e.g., writing a counterattitudinal essay, making a difficult decision, recognizing behavioral hypocrisy) and before the participant is provided with an opportunity to rationalize their behavior or adjust their attitudes.

11. Permissions & Fee and Test Year

The Psychological Discomfort scale was first published in 1994 in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology by the American Psychological Association (APA). As a standard scientific measurement tool developed for experimental research, the specific items (the descriptors uncomfortable, uneasy, and bothered) and their associated response format are accessible within the public academic literature for non-commercial educational and scholarly research purposes under fair use guidelines.

Researchers wishing to utilize the scale in experimental or applied research do not require formal paid licensing, provided that proper bibliographic citation is given to Elliot and Devine (1994). However, the original journal article in which the scale was introduced is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association. For commercial applications, inclusion in copyrighted psychometric testing batteries, or broad commercial digital deployment, users should consult the APA Permissions Office to verify rights and requirements.

12. References

• Aronson, E. (1968). Dissonance theory: Progress and problems. In R. P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. J. McGuire, T. M. Newcomb, M. J. Rosenberg, & P. H. Tannenbaum (Eds.), Theories of cognitive consistency: A sourcebook (pp. 5–27). Rand McNally.
• Aronson, E. (1992). The return of the repressed: Dissonance theory makes a comeback. Psychological Inquiry, 3(4), 303–311. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327965pli0304_1
• Bem, D. J. (1967). Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena. Psychological Review, 74(3), 183–200. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0024834
• Cooper, J., & Fazio, R. H. (1984). A new look at dissonance theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 17, pp. 229–266). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60121-5
• Croyle, R. T., & Cooper, J. (1983). Dissonance arousal: Physiological evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45(4), 782–791. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.45.4.782
• Elliot, A. J., & Devine, P. G. (1994). On the motivational nature of cognitive dissonance: Dissonance as psychological discomfort. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(3), 382–394. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.3.382
• Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press.
• Harmon-Jones, E. (2000). A cognitive analysis of the affect spectrum of cognitive dissonance. In E. Harmon-Jones & J. Mills (Eds.), Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology (pp. 71–99). American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/10318-004
• Kenworthy, J. B., Miller, N., Collins, B. E., Read, S. J., & Earleywine, M. (2011). A trans-paradigm theoretical synthesis of cognitive dissonance theory: Illuminating the nature of state dissonance. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 5(6), 361–383. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2011.00356.x
• Losch, M. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1990). Cognitive dissonance may enhance sympathetic tonus, but attitudes are changed to reduce negative affect rather than arousal. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 26(4), 289–304. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(90)90040-S
• Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 21, pp. 261–302). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60229-4
• Stone, J., Wiegand, A. W., Cooper, J., & Aronson, E. (1997). When exemplification fails: Hypocrisy and the motive for self-integrity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72(1), 54–65. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.72.1.54
• Sweeney, J. C., Hausknecht, D., & Soutar, G. N. (2000). Cognitive dissonance after purchase: A multidimensional scale. Psychology & Marketing, 17(5), 369–385. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.54.6.1063

13. Items of the Scale